------------------------------------------ -- EZ A SZÁM CSAK TEXT FORMÁBAN LÉTEZIK -- ------------------------------------------ Date: Sat, 16 Mar 91 22:48:16 EST Subject: *** FORUM *** #174 Tartalomjegyzek: ---------------- Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Temakor : Ortorony Felado : csorna@phyv01.phy.vanderbilt.edu Temakor : I. Magyar tortenelem - Angol szempont: Trianon Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Temakor : Tortenelemlecke Felado : 72600.3046@compuserve.com Temakor : ...from the margins - alternative media III. =============================================== Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Beerkezett: Sat Mar 16 03:21:22 EST 1991 Temakor : Ortorony - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Csak egy apro megjegyzes: Deak Istvan egy irasaban fedeztem fel: >Egy idosebb bacsika az Ortorony cimu vallasos iromanyt osztogatja, >mintha jehovista lenne. Ha jol emlekszem a soc.culture.christian -ban ugy olvastam, a Watchtower a jehovistak hivatalos lapja, olyasmi mint a L'Osservatore Romano a katolikusok- nak. Jehovistakat "visszateriteni" akaro keresztenyek kedvenc szorakozasa regi Watchtower-kiadvanyokat eloszedni, es be nem teljesult vilagvege-joslato- kat citalni belole. Azert veszik a faradtsagot a Watchtower felkutatasara, mert ha mas jehovista kiadvany josol masodik eljovetelt X evben Y napon, akkor az csak a jambor szerzo "maganvelemenye" a jehovistak szemeben, igy utolag nem tartjak blamazsnak a tevedest , meg ha de facto a jehovista kozosseg nagyobbik fele el is hitte a joslatot. A Watchtower viszont kinosabb, mert az a kozponti kiadvany, azt nem lehet kezlegyintessel elintezni. A Jehova tanui azert erdekesek, mert tudomasom szerint ok az egyetlen szekta, akik tobbszor is megjosoltak a vilag veget, es nem szuntek meg letezni a kritikus datum elmulasa utan. Jelenleg azt hiszem az az abra, hogy szerintuk Jezus mar visszaerkezett a foldre 1914-ben, de lathatatlanul jott, ahogy lathatatlanul ment el.(A "felhokon erkezo Emberfiat" "felhoben"-ertsd rejtve- erkezo Emberfianak ertelmezik.) Viszont, hogy az elso vilaghaboru nemzedeke nem hal ki a latvanyos vilagvege elott. Ez sokkal kifinomultabb "joslat", mint a primitiv datumadas, mert meg jo sokaig lehet arra hivatkoz- ni, hogy "biztos meg mindig el valaki az 1. vh. nemzedekebol".A csalodas tehat nem olyan elesen egyszerre, es nem olyan egyertelmuen jelentkezik, mint a hagyomanyos vilagvegevaro szektaknal. Istvan egyebkent nagyon elveztem otthoni eletkepeidet. Remelem ezutan is kul- desz majd beloluk! Udvozlettel: Hetyei Gabor =============================================== Felado : csorna@phyv01.phy.vanderbilt.edu Beerkezett: Sat Mar 16 15:29:22 EST 1991 Temakor : I. Magyar tortenelem - Angol szempont: Trianon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mikozben folyik az utodallamok felbomlasa ( Jugoszlavia, Csehszlovakia), erdemes attenkinteni a tortenelmi hattereket. Az alabbit Prof. Macartney irta. Macartney tobb even keresztul Magyarorszagon elt, jol beszelte a nyelvet, es a haboru alatt a BBC magyar nyelvu adasat kozvetitette. Az utolso 50 ev hazugsagai utan, sokaknak biztosan frissito lesz egy targyilagosab szempontot olvasni. Persze Macartney kuncsaftjai angolok voltak, ugyhogy az angolok buneit igyekszik takargatni. Mindennek ellenere ajanlon minden magyar embernek, hogy a konyvet olvassa el: OCTOBER FIFTEENTH, A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945, by C.A. Macartney, The Edinburgh University Press, 1961. Igy szolt Macartney Trianonrol: (A szamok a zarojelben a labjegyzetre utalnak.) ______________________________ p.4 [OCTOBER FIFTEENTH] To go no further back, the Treaty of Trianon, which Hungary signed on 4th June 1920, formed, once signed, a fixed point to which every subsequent act of Hungarian international policy was directly related, in attempts or preparations for attempts to secure revision of it, or, more rarely, in debate whether it might not be wise to modify or abandon the claim for revision on certain points in the light of new considerations most of which also arose out of the Versailles Peace System. Thus it is in any case necessary to recall, without criticism or justification, but simply in factual form, what the Treaty of Trianon did to Hungary. It made an end of the historic State which had existed ever since Arpad led his warriors across the Carpathians at the end of the ninth century A.D. Of its area (excluding Croatia-Slavonia) of 282,876 square kilometres, it assigned 4,020 to Austria, 61,633 to Czechoslovakia (1), 589 to Poland, 103,093 to Roumania, 21 to Italy and 20,547 to Yugoslavia, which also received the 42,541 square kilometres of Croatia-Slavonia, leaving Hungary herself with only 92,963. Of the population of 18,264,533 (Inner Hungary) (2), Austria received 291,618, Czechoslovakia 3,5l7,568,(3), Poland 23,662, Roumania 5,257,467, Italy 49,806 and Yugoslavia 1,509,295, besides the 2,621,954 inhabitants of Croatia-Slavonia. 7,615,117 persons were left to Hungary. And although the dismemberment of Hungary was effected in the name of national self-determination, substantial numbers of Magyars were, on any computation, transferred to the Successor States. The pre-war Hungarian census classified the inhabitants by "mother-tongue," and the persons of Magyar mother-tongue shown by the 1910 census as residing in the areas assigned to the Successor States (4) amounted to 26,183 to Austria, 1,063,020 to Czechoslovakia (5), 230 to Poland, 1,704,851 to Roumania, 6,493 to Italy and 441,787 to Yugoslavia (besides 105,948 in Croatia-Slavonia). Some of these were landlords, officials, traders or other upper and middle-class elements living in preponderantly non-Magyar areas, and there were also in all the main Successor States some Magyar villages which were remote from the new frontiers (notably the Szekels of Transylvania, a solid bloc several hundreds of thousands strong, in the extreme south-eastern corner of Transylvania). In many cases, however, solidly or preponderantly Magyar areas contiguous to the main central bloc of Magyar population were left outside Hungary's new frontiers for the economic or strategic benefit of the Successor States. In Hungary itself, the 1920 census showed 833,475 persons of mother-tongue other than Magyar, 551,624 of these being Germans and 141,918 Slovaks; nearly all these lived remote from the frontiers. Thus while the authors of the Treaty had held the ethnic principle to possess an overriding validity before which all historical, economic and other considerations must give way, they had, in practice, violated that principle very largely to the detriment of Hungary. And those other considerations had not been negligible. Historic Hungary had constituted a geographical unit of a perfection hardly to be matched in Europe, and the directors of its economic development in the nineteenth century had not only worked on the assumption that it would remain undivided, but had, for political reasons, stressed the interdependence of its parts even more strongly than would be suggested by natural conditions. So the Treaty which dismembered Hungary did not lop off outlying parts unconnected with the centre, or with each other; it cut through organic nexuses, severing sources of supply from factories, primary industries from their finishing counterparts, the finished product from its purchaser. The remnant which still called itself Hungary was left with useless amputated stumps sticking out in every direction and an economic structure unsuited to its natural conditions, being semi- industrialised, with emphasis on the finishing industry, but containing, so far as was then known (since the existence of neither its bauxite deposits nor its oil-fields was yet suspected), few mineral resources or sources of power and thus, as it appeared, destined by nature to be an agricultural country. The Treaty of Trianon contained two other important sets of provisions: the chapters relating respectively to reparations and to the limitation of armaments. The reparations clauses in the Treaty did not specify what sum Hungary would be required to pay, merely laying down that she would have to pay reparations, which would be "the first charge upon all the assets and resources of Hungary." The armaments provisions limited Hungary's armed forces to a long-service force of 35,000 officers and men, to be used exclusively for the maintenance of internal order and the defence of the frontiers. The armaments permitted were strictly limited: no heavy artillery, tanks or military air-force were allowed. The control over the execution of the provisions was entrusted to an Inter-Allied Control Commission. As Hungarian revisionism will dominate our entire story, it will be well to emphasise at this point that the desire and determination to achieve some revision of this Treaty were nation-wide in Hungary throughout the entire period. Obviously, they were more active among the politically minded classes, and obviously also there were in Hungary, as there are in every country, some persons-belonging chiefly to the socially unfortunate classes -to whom wider considerations made no appeal. Again, there developed, especially in the decade 1934-44, very considerable differences as to the amount of revision for which the country should work: a feeling then began to prevail fairly widely, especially among the younger generation, that the re-extension of Hungary's sovereignty over non-Magyar masses, unless with their full consent, was not practicable or even desirable. There were many and deep divergences of opinion on what would be the best tactics to pursue, and some of the courses advocated involved renunciations, on practical grounds, of revision in one direction or another, for very long periods. There was even a party which thought that so long as revision remained outside the sphere of practical politics all active revisionist agitation ought to be set temporarily aside in favour of a constructive social and domestic policy. In the 1930's the same party was so acutely aware of the German danger as to favour very far-reaching concessions indeed to Hungary's neighbours if by that means a common front could be established against the threat from Germany. But even this was essentially a tactical consideration. It is completely untrue to say that revision was desired only by landowners who wanted their estates back, and it is not even more than a half-truth that the regime kept the revision question alive in order to divert attention from social injustice at home; the not very flattering truth being that the remedy favoured by the regime against social discontent was not diversion but simple suppression. LABJEGYZETEK: (1) Slovakia, 48,994; Ruthenia, 12,639 (2) Census figures of 1910. (3) Slovakia, 2,946,080; Ruthenia, 571,488. (4) Adjusted after the Sopron plebiscite and other minor rectifications. (5) Slovakia, 893,586; Ruthenia, 169,434. =============================================== Felado : hetyei@athena.mit.edu Beerkezett: Sat Mar 16 18:05:17 EST 1991 Temakor : Tortenelemlecke - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A preview.FORUM-ban olvastam csorna@phyv01.phy.vanderbilt.edu (sajnos a nevalairas kovetkezetesen lemarad) cikket Trianonrol. Jo dolog ez a preview.FORUM: lehetove teszi, hogy az olyan irasok, amelyekre muszaj valaszolni, meg aznap kello kiegeszitessel jelenjenek meg. Igy talan kevesebb ember vernyomasa megy fel az egeszsegre artalmas mertekig. Nezzuk tehat: >Mikozben folyik az utodallamok felbomlasa ( Jugoszlavia, Csehszlovakia), >erdemes attenkinteni a tortenelmi hattereket. Nagyszeru. Eloszor is tisztazzuk az "utodallam" szot: minek az utodallama Jugo- szlavia. Magyarorszage? Ugyan nem, hisz Szlovenia sose volt Mo. resze, es meg Horvatorszag is legalabbis hivatalosan, csak perszonalunioban volt vele. A Monarchiae? Ugyan nem, hisz Szerbia, Montenegro es Macedonia sose volt a Mo- narchia resze. Csehszlovakiara mar inkabb alkalmazhato lenne az "utodallam" kifejezes, de ott se tartom szerencsesnek. Ilyen alapon Magyarorszagot is lehet nevezni a frank birodalom, Nagy-Moravia, vagy Pribina es Kocel feje- delemsege "utodallamanak". Vagy ha kozelebbi multba kivanunk visszamenni, hat az oszman birodalom utodallamanak. Ugye nem esne jol nekunk se ? A tortenelmi hatterek attekintesenek lenne persze ertelme, amennyiben segite- ne megerteni a mai feszultsegeket. Jobban meg lehetne erteni pl. a szlovak tulerzekenyseget, ha figyelembe vesszuk, hogy a szlovakoknak sose lehetett sajat allama nehany olyan 2. vh-beli evtol eltekintve, melyeket jobb elfelej- teni. Viszont mi jon folytataskent? Szerb tortenelem? Horvat tortenelem? Szlovak tortenelem? Egyik sem: Trianon kovetkezik, szamomra erthetetlen logikaval. > Az alabbit Prof. Macartney >irta. Macartney tobb even keresztul Magyarorszagon elt, jol beszelte a nyelvet >,es a haboru alatt a BBC magyar nyelvu adasat kozvetitette. Az utolso 50 ev >hazugsagai utan, sokaknak biztosan frissito lesz egy targyilagosab szempontot >olvasni. Fejszamolas: 1991-50=1941. Udito vegre az "utobbi negyven ev" hazugsagainak emlegetese utan egy arra valo utalast latni, hogy azelott se mondtak mindenben igazat. A 45 es 49 kozti 4 evet kivennem a "tortenelmi kontinuitasbol", cserebe hozzatennek nehany evet 41 elottrol,de a lenyeggel egyetertek: ebben a temaban a 2. vilaghaboru elott is es utan is hazudozas folyt Magyarorszagon. > Persze Macartney kuncsaftjai angolok voltak, ugyhogy az angolok >buneit igyekszik takargatni. Pedig igazan vezeklocsuhat olthetett volna, amiert a foldijei ellenfelei voltak a dicsoseges Magyarorszagnak a vilaghaboruban. Szegeny ugyan mentegetoz- hetne, hogy nekik ugye elsosorban a nemetekkel voltak rendezendo szamlaik, es a tobbi csak a diplomacia fejlemenye, meg hogy a haboru utan is nem az angolok lobbyztak a legerosebben Magyarorszag feldarabolasa mellett, dehat igazan le- hetett volna "objektivabb". > Mindennek ellenere ajanlon minden magyar embernek,hogy a konyvet olvassa el: Miert "minden magyar embernek"? Miert nem egyszeruen "mindenkinek"? Letezik egy kulon magyar igazsag az egyetemes igazsag mellett, es nem magya- rok nem ertenek meg a konyv igazsagat? Arrol, hogy "magyarok Istene" letezik, mar hallottam. Privat magyar igazsagrol meg nem, szerintem egy olyan kis es olyan bonyolult helyzetben elo nepnek, mint a mienk, a sajat igazsag meg nagyobb luxus, mint a sajat atombomba. Maga az angol nyelvu idezett cikk valoban targyilagosnak tunik, targyilago- sabbnak a bevezetonel. Remelhetoleg a konyv nem idezett reszeiben az is megem- litodik, hogy mikozben valoban kerultek at magyar kisebbsegek hatarainkon tul- ra, jelentos nem-magyar tomegek nyertek fuggetlenseget a szamukra idegen magyar uralomtol. Nagy-Magyarorszagon a magyar ajkuak letszamaranya a 40 es az 50% kozott mozgott. Ennel az oroszok meg ma is kicsit jobban allnak az 51 %-kukkal a szovjet lakossagban. Ennek ellenere ugy tunik, nekik is elobb utobb fel kell adniuk teruleteket. Pedig ok meg vilaghaborut se vesztettek. A Karpat medence fodrajzi osszetartozasaval melysegesen egyetertek. Mindez sugallja, hogy a Karpat-medence nepei is jobban jarnanak, ha egyutt tudnanak mukodni. Azt viszont nem sugallja, hogy ennek az egyuttmukodesnek magyar vezetes alatt kell folynia. Szamomra ez is Trianon tanulsagai koze tartozik. Termeszetesen sokat lehetne meg vitatkozni ezen a teman. Ahogy azon is lehetne keseregni, micsoda igazsagtalansag, hogy 48-ban a car segitett Ferenc Joskanak, vagy hogy elvesztettuk a mohacsi csatat. A vegen talan eljuthatnank oda is, hogy felfedezzuk, amit egy nagyon kedves tortenesz baratom ismert fel: a 9. sz-ban lett volna lehetosegunk tovabbmenni Lombardiaba, es akkor ugye az egesz tortenelmunk maskepp alakul. Kerdesem csak az: ha mar Jugoszlaviarol es Csehszlovakiarol van szo, nem lenne erdemesebb azt figyelni, hogy ott mi tortenik ? Nem lenne erdemesebb arra kon- centralnunk, hogy "rendezzuk vegre kozos dolgainkat" szomszedainkkal, ahogy az a megatalkodott kommunista Jozsef Attila monda ? Udvozlettel: Hetyei Gabor =============================================== Felado : 72600.3046@compuserve.com Beerkezett: Sat Mar 16 21:07:37 EST 1991 Temakor : ...from the margins - alternative media III. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ha mar gombvillamokrol, Uri Gellerrol, kanalhajlitasrol es UFOkrol van szo, egy talan tobbetek altal is mar ismert publikaciot szeretnek bemutatni, a WHOLE EARTH REVIEW-t. Ennek ugyanis 86-os oszi szama ezzel a kerdeskorrel foglalkozik kb. egy tucat cikkben a The Fringes of Reason, Strange Myths and Eccentric Science cimszo alatt. Ted Schultz irja a bevezetoben: In the past 200 years, scientific knowledge has succeeded in contradicting many of the mythic teachings of traditional religion, but it has failed to take on religion's role of providing meaning and hope in what for many is a dreary and mundane world. The new mythologies have emerged to fill this visionary void. Despite homogeneous mass media and social standardization on a vast scale, myriad strange beliefs spawn, fission, and multply. Unusual religions. Space-age folklore. Pseudoscientific theories beyond counting. If modern myths are cultural expressions, then their creators and adharents are social experimenters - however misguided, erratic, or uneducated - who are attempting to bridge that chasm between the visionary and the scientific in order to build a new unifying myth. At worst, they show us dead ends that we need not traverse again. At best, they provide us with clues, puzzle pieces for our Future Collective Myth, if such a thing is to be. If we can entertain possibilities while withholding belief, we can safely explore this world of modern mythology for sheer pleasure. The myths can be appreciated as art if not as actual reflections of reality, manifestations of human creativity in spectecular diversity. The appreciator of the carnival of strange beliefs can dip below the surface of superficial cultural homogeneity to enjoy the wonders and the curiosities, the freaks and the aberrations, and especially the occasional dark-lustred pearl netted from the depths. As Stewart Brand observed at a recent public celebration, "You've got to explore the edges to see where the middle is going." This special issue of Whole Earth Review explores the edges. A magazin profiljat nehez lenne meghatarozni, mottoja az "Access to tools and ideas", es valami ilyesmirol van szo. Aki peldaul a legujabb compumaniara, a "virtual reality"-re, vagy a nanotechnologiara kivancsi, annak ajanlom a tavaly nyari szamot, ahol ezekrol reszletesen lehet olvasni. A mostani teli szam Japanra fokuszal, csak nehany erdekesebb cikk cimet kiragadva: The Culture of Corporate Beings; Two Real Problems in U.S.-Japan relations; Observations on Cross-Cultural Electronic Networking(!!!); Cross-Cultural Communication & Computer-Supported Cooperative Work; Video in Japan; The Environmental Movement in Japan; Japanese Whaling; Some Japanese Thinkers; etc., etc. A Whole Earth Review nagyon a periferiarol indult, manapsag azonban a nagyobb ujsagarusoknal es legtobb kozkonyvtarban megtalalhato. Az o kezukben van az orszag egyik legnagyobb BBS-e, a WELL is, ahol tobb tucat temakorben lehet konferenciazni: Business and Education, Social and Political (AIDS, Central America, parenting, poetry, philosophy, sexuality, etc.), Computers (ezen belul is kb. 20 kulonbozo temakor), Technical and Communications Conferences, Grateful Dead Conferences, etc., etc. (Hasznalati dij $8/mo., $2/hr. Modemmel (415)332-6106, 1200 baud,E-7-1-F, type:newuser. Utana lehet 2400-as vonalat is hasznalni.) Impresszum: Published quarterly by POINT, a California nonprofit corporation. Editorial office: 27 Gate Five Road, Sausalito, CA 94965. Subs: $20/yr. Inquire for first class and international air rates. Back issues are available on microfilm. % Nem errol akartam irni, de nem tudok ellenallni a kisertesnek, hogy kedvcsinalokent/kedv elvevokent a Nation e heti szamahoz, ne masoljak ide egy "konnyedebb irast", reszletet Alexander Cockburn rovatabol. First the Bad News Once upon a time, a year or so ago, optimists said that the cold war was over and that with the rationale for the "national security state" annulled by Soviet implosion, a new age would dawn: swords into plowshares, war dollars into peace dollars, arms factories into schoolhouses. Realists said that the cold war, in application rather than rhetoric, had been about control of people, markets and resources in the Third World and that Soviet Collapse would merely remove an inhibition on the triumphant superpower from imposing this control with even greater ruthlessness. Optimists said that the collapse of Stalinist regimes would permit true socialism to flower. Realists said that capitalism did not care for negotiated withdrawals. Optimists said that without its old and necessary foe the United States would finally had to address its real problems: a skewed economy, worsening distribution of income, wasted regions, poisoned soils, blighted lives. Realists said America had always solved its domestic crisis by foreign adventure, and it was only a matter of time before it found a new enemy, a new war. Then a fellow called Saddam Hussein figured that the United States was signaling that it would be O.K. if he moved into Kuwait. What an optimist he turned out to be. [Mielott barki elfogultsaggal vadolna Cockburn-t, hadd jegyezzem meg, hogy o mar akkor elitelte Saddamot, mikor Bushek meg javaban kebel cimborak voltak vele, amit az is mutat, hogy tavaly augusztusig, Mexico utan Iraknak adta az USA a legnagyobb export kedvezmenyt.] More Bad News President Bush said on January 17 that this time it would not be like Vietnam and this time U.S. troops would not fight "with one hand tied behind their back." Most Americans seem to have approved of the sentiment. But why did they think the war against the Vietnamese had been thus hubbled? After all, the United States killed 2 million Vietnamese, which doesn't suggest much tiresome restraint. It turns out that a good many Americans think that only some 100,000 Vietnamese got killed, which is like a German saying in 1962 that only 300,000 Jews were murdered in the death camps and that the Final Solution had been conducted mit einer Hand hinter dem Rucken gebunden. This testimony to successful historical rewrite and the recuperative force of American sanctimony came in a survey conducted February 2 through 4, just over two weeks into the war, under the supervision of three academic researchers -Sut Jhally, Justin Lewis and Michael Morgan. Two hundred fifty people in the Denver metropolitan area, selected at random, were interviewed by telephone. The idea was to find out what sort of job television had done in communicating pertinent facts about the gulf war and its origins. The answer, though the academic team doesn't quite see it that way, is that TV news did a tremendous job. After being drenched in gulf coverage for six months most people were pitifully ignorant of the facts. The more they watched the more ignorant they were. The surveyors broke down their respondents' TV viewing into three groups: light (less than an hour and a half a night), medium (between an hour and a half and three hours) and heavy (more than three hours). Among the light viewers 16 percent thought Kuwait was a democracy, 22 percent knew of the intifada and 40 percent were aware that Iraq's was not the only foreign occupation in the Middle East. Among the heavy viewers 32 percent thought Kuwait was a democracy, only ten percent had heard of the intifada and 23 percent were aware of occupations other than Iraq's. To my surprise, 14 percent knew that the United States was among three nations in the U.N. that had voted against a call for a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Don't be downhearted. Almost as many, 12 percent, thought it was Iraq that voted against the resolution. It was all as you might expect. A big majority, 74 percent, believed that the U.S. government had warned Iraq in advance of the invasion that it would impose sanctions, and almost as large a number thought their government had at that point vowed to support Kuwait with military force. Only two percent of the respondents could identify Kuwait's undercutting of the oil price as a reason for Iraq's attack. When Saddam Hussein called for "linkage", two out of every three Americans - on the basis of this survey - scratched their heads and answered, "Linkage to what?" Fewer than a third were aware that Israel is illegally occupying the territories and part of Lebanon. There was a direct correlation between knowledge and opposition to the war. The war supporters simply knew less. They were twice as likely to maintain that Kuwait was a democracy, less than half as likely to know that befor August 2 the official U.S. posture to prospective Iraqi attack was See if we care. The only fact that war supporters were more aware of was the name of the Patriot missile. The researchers conclude, high-mindedly enough, that "the news media have failed, quite dramatically, in their role as information providers. Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or about the recent history of U.S. policy towards Iraq". I hope they don't believe this nonsense but just shoved it in as a sign of good will. Substitute the word "succeeded" for "failed" and the sentence makes sense. Beat the Devil, The Nation, March 18, 1991 Leirer Laszlo