Hollosi Information eXchange /HIX/
HIX HUNGARY 675
Copyright (C) HIX
1996-05-22
Új cikk beküldése (a cikk tartalma az író felelőssége)
Megrendelés Lemondás
1 Re: lying (mind)  23 sor     (cikkei)
2 Re: a summary description (mind)  99 sor     (cikkei)
3 Re: Marx meat (mind)  27 sor     (cikkei)
4 Review: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes -- magyar nem (mind)  316 sor     (cikkei)
5 Re: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes_ (mind)  119 sor     (cikkei)
6 Re: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes_ (mind)  102 sor     (cikkei)
7 Megalomanians and Ruritanians (mind)  106 sor     (cikkei)
8 Mr. Kornai's hate speech reasoning. (mind)  73 sor     (cikkei)
9 Re: History (mind)  18 sor     (cikkei)
10 Hungary (mind)  17 sor     (cikkei)
11 Re: Marx meat (mind)  21 sor     (cikkei)
12 Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind)  69 sor     (cikkei)
13 Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind)  42 sor     (cikkei)
14 Re: 1956 was a Szabadsagharc (mind)  84 sor     (cikkei)
15 Re: ...dominated 1700s... (mind)  122 sor     (cikkei)
16 Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind)  107 sor     (cikkei)
17 [61] PARLIAMENT RECOGNIZES SAME-SEX COMMON-LAW RELATION (mind)  23 sor     (cikkei)
18 Re: ...dominated 1700s... (mind)  66 sor     (cikkei)

+ - Re: lying (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article >, Eva Durant
> writes:

>I resolved not to respond anymore for this reason, however,
>it bugs me if he goes on calling me all sorts without being
>challenged. What shall I do? I don't want to contribute
>to the personal irrelevant petty feuds. I like to argue
>about ideas. I do my best not to hate anybody, even if I
>detest their ideas.  I'm on this list to learn and to question,
>and as such I found it useful over the years.
>
>Eva Durant

Ha! Getting out before you humiliate yourself even further, eh? Damn...and
I was really having a good time.
Sam Stowe

P.S. -- I take it from the above that you are not going to take the simple
step of checking the book out of the library, reading it and debating from
there.

P.S.S. -- If you don't like being called a liar, don't accuse someone else
of lying in the first place.
+ - Re: a summary description (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

> Felado :  [United States]
> I am pleased to see Mr. Fencsik's true color when he tries to glue
> such a title as "Nazi scumbags".
I am pleased to see that too. There are few people who merit the summary
description `Nazi scumbag' as clearly as Mr. Neme1nyi, whose primary line
of argumentation always boils down to the following points:

1. _Perhaps_ Sza1lasi was bad, but the communists were much worse.
2. The communists are all Jews.
3. Today's liberals are a continuation of communist power, and they
are also Jews.
4. The Jews don't _always_ sacrifice young children in ritual murders
and drink their blood, he never said they _always_ do this.

At his debut on FORUM, that wonderful meeting point of like minds, Neme1nyi's
first appearance (March 5 1993, FORUM #865) revolved around the old canard
that Iva1n Peto3 (a leading politician of the liberal SZDSZ) is the son of
E1va Ka1llay (a communist who committed suicide in 1956). Since this would
serve to illustrate Neme1nyi's point 3, the news that Peto3's mother made a
public appearence, which is tough for someone dead for nearly forty years,
needed to be countered. So he wrote:

> A cikkiro liberalizmusra buzdit s kivancsi lennek, ha velet lenul
> veletlenul valami gonosz csoda folytan horogkeresztes vagy sarlo
> kalapacsos, avagy uram bocsa.  cedrusfas zaszlo krealodna Budapesten
> akkor is kitartana liberalizmusa mellett?  ???  Aligha! Es joggal,
> mert az komoly embertomegeket sertene akik szerintem semmivel
> sem fontossabbak, mint azok a budapestiek akiket szinvaksagra itel egy
> megkerdo- lezheto vezeto csoport ugykodese.
>
> A Peto Ivan ugyhoz meg csak annyit, hogy ha az anyja nem is
> jelenhetett meg a targyalason , az AVO-hoz barmilyen formaban kotodo
> emberek szelleme bizton jelen volt.

The characteristic _perhaps_ emerges a month later (Apr 3 1993, FORUM #893):

> Nem valoszinu, hogy a magyar tobbseg visszasirna Szalasit jobban,
> mint Kunt, vagy Kadart
[It is improbable that the Hungarian majority would like to see Sza1lasi
return more than Kun or Ka1da1r]. Improbable, but far from impossible.

Three days later (FORUM #897) point 1 appears in its full glory:

> A Magyarok mint nep nem azt a szuk reteget kepviselte, amit Szalasi
> politikajaval lehetne femjelezni. Az a nep egy nemet hadsereg alltal
> hatalmon levo szuk, de mas erejevel biro reteg uralma alatt allt. De ez
> a kep nem ismeros az 1945 utani idokbol? Hol voltak azok, akik a magyar
> nepnek a szemebe merik vagni, hogy nem leptek fel a gyilkosokkal szemben
> az 1945 utani idoszakban? Lehet hogy uralmon?! Rendkivul serto szamomra,
> hogy a sajat szuleim akar naci vagy nemet collaboracioval vannak gyalazva
> reven, hogy azokban az idokben ok is a MAGYAR NEPET KEPVISELTEK! Addig
> amig a Szalasi utani idok gyilkosai folott nem kondul meg a lelekharang,
> addig ez a temakor a hippokratizmus netovabbja.

Neme1nyi never misses an opportunity to note that this or that communist was
of Jewish origin -- Trotsky's name is follwed by (Bronstein) in parentheses,
that sort of thing. When one of his opponents mentions that gee, he somehow
always fails to note the opposite, the reply comes straight from his heart:

>Tulajdonkeppen most bujt ki a szog a zsakbol. Biztosan azt akartad mondani,
>hogy a VALLASOK palastja moge bujt gyilkossagok?!! Mert ha nem, akkor a
>KUN-Rakosi vonal emberei igen megharagudhatnak rad. Mert gondolok itt arra,
>hogy nem nagyon szeretik, ha lekeresztenyezik oket. Persze az ilyen celratoro
>meghatarozas az ertelemtol nem gatolva, szinte azonnal keresztenyeket kezd
>keresni akar a mai lelenlegi indiai vallasi gyilkossagok mogott is. Gondolom
>belatod, hogy gyatra sikerrel. Magyarorszagon a keresztenyezes igazabol a
>zsido-magyar polarizacio kifejezoje, aminek halatlan feladat akar vedojenek
>akar kritizalojanak lenni. Megemliteni a keresztenyseget, mint bunok eszkozet
>hippokratizmus a tobbi vallas leple alatt elkovetett bunok elhalgatasa mellett
.
>De ha szigoruan ragaszkodsz a vallasi ertelmezeshez aminek persze sok esetben
>csak a keresztlevel szintjen volt ertelme, akkor a szalasi ugy egy kereszteny,
>keresztlevellel rendelkezo vezeto hozza hasonlo szuletesi dokumentummal
 ellatott
>szuk retegere vonatkozik, aminek az implikacioja, hogy az orszag tobbsege
>ugyancsak rendelkezett keresztlevellel.  Ezutan mar nem hosszu az ut a
>bogatyazasig es a Kun-Rakosizasig, ami ha tetszik neked, ha nem, visszakanya-
>ritja a temat a politikai megkozeliteshez. (FORUM #899)

Here we see the first occurrence of ritual murders, this time in India. Later
his point 4. gets elaborated on FORUM, but we don't need to go there to see
it, for it's right here, in yesterday's HUNGARY:

> It is a stretch to credit me of any "Goebbelsian gibberish" if I was
> the very one, who put the blame on Goebbels of using blood accusations
> against the MASSES of innocent Jewish people.
Oh, yes, the masses. Now the few, or not so few, who were really guilty of
ritual murder ("blood accusation" is of course "ve1rva1d", a term familiar
to students of Hungarian history), they just deserved what they got.

> And as far as the translation of Mr. Farkas goes, I can only
> thank him for it.
And as far as the epithet `Nazi scumbag' goes, rarely do we see such a
splendid specimen outside FORUM. If Mr. Farkas is willing to undertake
a more extensive translation effort, the FORUM archives have virtually
unlimited supplies of what Ga1bor Fencsik calls `Goebbelsian gibberish'.
'nuff said.

Andra1s Kornai
+ - Re: Marx meat (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 08:24 PM 5/18/96 -0400, Sam Stowe, wrote:

>Please don't insult Joyce's memory by comparing him with a hack like Marx.
>Actually, your comments may draw down the wrath of Durant for insinuating
>that Marx is anything less than crystal clear and powerfully eloquent in
>his dialectic. I didn't say he was hard to understand. He wasn't. He was
>just boring and unconvincing. And I don't need to ask your opinion. Lo, it
>has already arrived on my screen unbidden.

You're being a tad defensive.  I never said that you found Marx hard to
understand.  I was trying to say, perhaps too subtly for you, that trying to
understand Marx by reading "Capital" is a nonstarter.  It's a boring
economic book.  One doesn't have to read "Capital" to understand that a
small group of 'capitalists', or whatever you want to call the powerful
ruling elite, dominates and 'exploits' the majority. You may not think that
this is the situation today but that would just show that the dominant
ideology has won you over.  But that shouldn't be a surprise to you if you'd
read "The German Ideology"  where Marx said that, "The ideas of the ruling
class are in every epoch the ruling ideas..."

Now I ask you, Sam.  Do you really think it's fair to call Marx a hack?
Does he have nothing to say?  And on a personal note, why are you still
fighting the cold war?  It's been over for a while.  The "West" won.  But
just remember that Germany and Japan lost the Second world war.  And boy,
are they suffering today.

Joe Szalai
+ - Review: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes -- magyar nem (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear fellow-listmembers,

The following review appeared recently on another list I read, HABSBURG
(an H-NET list devoted to anything dealing with Austrian history or the
history of states once part of the Habsburg empire since about 1500).
I thought it might be of interest to at least some of us, so with permis-
sion from H-NET I am reposting it and the ensuing discussion here.  All
copyright is retained by H-NET and further reposting is prohibited except
as stated in the copyright notice at the end.

Sincerely,
Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
HABSBURG Reviews 1996/17                                May 15, 1996

                Slovaks in Hungary during the Dualist Era

Reviewed by Irina Popova, Central European University, for HABSBURG
>

Laszlo Szarka. _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes -- magyar nemzetisegi politika
1867-1918_. Pozsony: Kalligram Konyvkiado, 1995. 340 pp. Notes, tables,
maps, bibliography. HUF 400, Sk 80 (hardbound), ISBN 80-7149-087-3.

Laszlo Szarka is a researcher at the Hungarian Academy's Institute of
History, and responsible editor of a journal on nationality affairs
entitled _Regio_.  His book _Slovak National Development -- Hungarian
Nationality Policy 1867-1918_ presents a segment of the Slovaks' history,
for which he provided a general account in a previous work, _A szlovakok
tortenete_ (Note 1). Unlike others who have written on the subject, Szarka
contextualizes the dualist era in Slovak history through the perspective
of the nationalities issue in Hungary, state and local policy toward the
nationalities, the process of the formation of the Czechoslovak state, and
the Trianon peace settlement.

  Generally speaking, the writings on the national histories and the
comparative approach (Note 2) to the national movements emphasize the
particularities of each national group in the multinational regions (which
is logical) but almost put aside the problems of national integration and
assimilation.  In the Hungarian-Slovak case, the history of both nations
has been mainly presented as the history of discrete entities developing
within themselves (Note 3).  The enormous literature on Hungarian-Slovak
economical, political, and cultural relations can hardly compensate for
the lack of attention to inter-ethnic processes. Szarka solves the problem
of moving the Hungarian context closer to the Slovak national movement by
paying much attention to local policy, which simultaneously enables him to
bring new content to the notion "Hungarian national policy," which has
been treated by both Slovak and Hungarian scholars mainly as the central
government's policy.  Szarka's book is important if one takes into
consideration the fact that works on the Slovak issue as the subject of
Hungarian policies are not very numerous.

  Without an over indulgence in theory but with allusions to Miroslav
Hroch and Oszkar Jaszi, Szarka views the contest of middle class-based
nationalisms as one of the center and the periphery, which took place in
the periphery; his analysis presents a picture of the active interaction
of the two national movements on the local level. Examining the emerging
Slovak economic and political structures within the rigid Hungarian
framework, Szarka argues that its impact on the Slovaks was far more
complex than simple linguistic Magyarization. The book could also be
considered a history of Slovak-Hungarian mutual perceptions, and the
author shows the remarkable consistency of the arguments in Hungarian
-Slovak debates, the vitality of myths, and the distorted Hungarian image
of the Slovak national movement during the Dualist era.  Szarka bases his
findings on wide research in published and unpublished documents from an
impressive list of Hungarian and Slovakian archives, and buttresses his
conclusions with maps and tables illustrating the nationalities'
assimilation, migration, and plans for the solution of the Slovak national
question.

   The book contains chapters discussing the ideological basis of
Hungarian national policy and of the nationalities' counter-arguments, the
development and political organisation of Slovak society, the Hungarian
treatment of the Slovak question, the motives of Slovak separatism, and
the Paris peace conference's solution of the Slovak question.

  Hungarian politicians based their arguments concerning the nationalities
on the traditional concept of an indivisible Hungarian political nation,
which implied the linguistic unity of the country.  This concept
restricted a possible solution of the national problem through concessions
in the use of local languages, for it made no allowance for the autonomy
demanded by the nationalities and that Lajos Kossuth considered crucial
for the country's survival.  Certain rights to use the national languages
were granted by the liberal Nationality Law of 1868, but its effect was
substantially restricted by the laws 1879:XXVIII, 1883:XXX, 1891:XI, and
especially by the Apponyi Law 1907:XXVII which displayed "the
contradictions of the distributive character of Hungarian legal norms and
the discriminative character of political practices" (p. 49). In general,
the author states that "the concept of the political nation, elevated to
the ideal of the Hungarian national state, together with the real and
imagined results of political and linguistic assimilation, did not
jeopardize the existence of the nationalities during the decades of
dualism, but proved to be a regressive force in the democratization of the
country's political life." (p. 43)

  The elites of the ethnic minorities in the Hungarian kingdom emphasized
the Hungarian but not the Magyar character of the state, and tried to
prove they had contributed equally to Hungarian statebuilding.  Therefore
they believed the state should consist of equal national constituencies,
especially since the Compromise had established a model for the
redistribution of power. The Hungarian practice of centralization made
ethnic elites receptive to ideas of autonomy and to the forms of local
autonomy practised in Switzerland and England.  Centralization also
conditioned the route the nationalities would eventually choose for their
emancipation: they finally turned to the radical alternative of creating
small national states rather than to the federalization of the larger
state unit.  As for Slovaks, the validity of their arguments and their
ability to present the national program at the state level were weakened
from the start by the fact that Upper Hungary (_Felvidek_, _Slovensko_)
did not have a special administrative status in the Hungarian kingdom, so
that the Slovak national issue proved to be primarily a matter for the
local authorities.  Consequently, Slovak national ideology was an amalgam
of regionalism, loyalty to the Hungarian state, the idea of Czech-Slovak
unity, and Pan-Slavic Russophilia.  Slovaks' desire for autonomy did not
contradict the integrity of the Hungarian state; nonetheless, Szarka
argues it was a coincidence of two processes -- state integration
paralleled and attended by linguistic assimilation and ethno-regional
integration -- that was the main source of national conflict in Hungary.

  According to Szarka, assimilation displays the level of the
nationalities' integration into the state and reflects the positive social
and economic processes connected with it. The author indicates several
patterns of assimilation that depended upon the social structure of an
ethnic group. Among the Hungarian nationalities, the Germans had the
highest rate of assimilation (21% of the population was assimilated
between 1880-1910); and Ruthenians and Romanians, losing 2.8% and 1.4% of
their population respectively as a result of assimilation, had the lowest
rate (p. 254, table 7).  Szarka estimates the number of assimilated
Slovaks at 300,000-400,000 during 1880-1910, or 14.8% of the Slovak
population of two million (pp. 65, 254, table 7). The erosion of the
middle landowners' stratum and the growth in the number of petty
landowners (both predominantly Slovak), industrialization, urbanization,
the construction of the railroad system, and the Hungarian education
system greatly promoted Slovaks' assimilation and the assimilation of
their national elite.  Thus, in 1910 there were only 3304 intellectuals
whose native language was Slovak (p. 187-188).

  The degree of success of state integration and Magyarization has been
the subject of much discussion in the recent literature.  Szarka argues
that Slovaks demonstrated a rather low level of state integration among
all compactly-living nationalities.  One of the reasons for this is the
ambiguous effect of the factors of assimilation mentioned above: they also
nurtured the Slovak regional integration tendencies. The other obstacle to
assimilation and integration can be seen in cultural mechanisms, since the
national cultures were rather self-confined, and the national elites tried
to reject Hungarian cultural supremacy by all means. Yet the Hungarian
cultural pattern seems to have been attractive to the elites, especially
if one considers the high rate of their assimilation.

  The book, however, leaves open the question of the process of regional
integration in Northern Hungary.  It would appear to the reviewer that the
weak institutionalization of the Slovak national movement and insufficient
regional integration were responsible for the low level of the Slovaks'
integration into the Hungarian state.  Slovaks themselves presented a
splintered object for the application of the state's policy, especially as
the true character of the movement was distorted by the frightening veil
of Pan-Slavism.

  Discussing the political organization of Slovak society, Szarka
identifies as its key problems the representation of specific ethnic
interests and the participation in the political life of the Hungarian
kingdom. This tendency was expressed first by cultural institutions, for
instance the _Matica slovenska_, although its program did not contain a
word about a Slovak political party. The national party, Slovak National
Party (SNP), emerged in 1871 but its political debut in the parliamentary
elections of 1875 failed and was followed by almost twenty years of
passivity.  Szarka examines two forms of SNP's integration into the
Hungarian political system: the cooperation with the non-Hungarian
national parties, and the support for the Hungarian parties that could
have represented Slovak interests. As a result, the elements of the
Hungarian political structure were developed within the SNP's party
structure, which embraced too many heterogeneous elements (including
geographic groupings and the traditional Catholic-Protestant division) to
be a cohesive structure and to provide for the national political
representation, integration, and mobilization of the Slovak elite. In this
respect, the collaboration with the Czechs appears to be a compensation
for the weakness of Slovak political institutions.

  The Czechs were the most active party in this process of rapprochement,
establishing financial institutions, providing educational possibilities,
and raising Slovak issues in the _Reichsrat_.  Yet Czech-Slovak contacts
could not smooth over the economic and political contradictions between
the two national movements.  Therefore a solution to the Slovak problem by
means of the Czech connection, and especially by a common Czech-Slovak
state, was illusory, although the SNP gravitated to this option during
World War I.  The Slovaks' uncertainty about the Czech scenario is thus
one of the explanations for the lack of Slovak initiative and for their
hesitation in 1918.

  Szarka distinguishes several persistent elements in Hungarian
nationality policy. The first of these is the problem of linguistic
unification. The state's means to this end was the unification of the
heterogeneous school system, placing it under state control, since it was
the church that dominated the educational structure.  In order to achieve
this goal, an ambitious program of establishing one thousand new public
schools to commemorate the Millennium was initiated by Banffy's
government.  The number of non-Hungarian national schools fell
dramatically, especially while the Apponyi Law of 1907 was in effect.
Thus, 148 Slovak schools closed between 1907 and 1912 (p. 172).

  The state sought to influence policy in the counties by sponsoring the
creation of the Upper Hungarian Cultural Association, FEMKE (1882), which
used the Hungarian language, and the Hungarian Slovak Cultural Association
(1885), which used Slovak.  Both sought to spread the Hungarian value
system, culture, literature, and certain forms of social and economic
life.  The effect of these organizations was minimal, since they did not
enjoy broad support from either the Hungarian or the Slovak side.  FEMKE's
leadership saw the inauspicious economic situation in Northern Hungary as
a stimulus for Slovak nationalism, and formulated a complex program of
action in 1913; the plan never materialized, for the Magyarizing trend
remained intact.

  The Szapary government made some effort to coordinate the counties'
policies.  It initiated a discussion of Slovak problems with the heads of
the county administration in 1890 in preparation for a conference on the
Slovak problem. The discussion showed that local authorities adhered very
much to the myth of Pan-Slavism, fed to a certain extent by the growing
Czech-Slovak cooperation. A special institution to deal with the
nationality problem was created by Banffy's government, the Nationalities
and Socialist Affairs Department, which employed representatives of the
ethnic elites, but did not influence seriously the governmental
decision-making. The government attempted to create an information network
in the northern counties, requiring data on the character of the national
movement, on the social strata involved, and on the Slovak national
leaders' activityies. The reports from the counties were not very
informative, however, because the local authorities' vision of the problem
was obscured by the myth of a Pan-Slav conspiracy.

  Beginning in the 1880s, Hungarian governments had to face the problem of
mass emigration. Overall it amounted to two million, of which there were
482,613 persons from Upper Hungary (Note 4), and the government tried to
solve the problem by social relief for the most "dangerous" regions and
for returning former emigrants (e.g., the relief measures initiated by the
Coalition Government in 1907-1908), and by initiatives abroad. An example
of the latter is the attempt of Kalman Szell to influence Slovaks in
America, and their parishes, through priests and newspapers.  Szell shared
the strong belief that it was the emigrants and returning former emigrants
who presented an important source of funding for the Slovak national
movement, so he sought to counterbalance Slovak financial institutions,
first of all the Tatra Bank that was closely connected with the SNP, with
Hungarian banks.

  Hungarian policy toward the Slovaks, especially in the counties,
actually a policy based on a position of strength, and a struggle against
the more imagined than real peril of Pan-Slavism, was aimed at the highest
possible level of control over the Slovak national movement. Yet the
Hungarian political elite felt constrained to work for positive
achievements in this area. The clearest expression of this occurred in the
period of the Coalition government of 1906-1910, and of the limited
compromise that Istvan Tisza reached with the nationalities through
personal contacts. Both were a deviation from the policy of Magyarization
and repression that was dominant in the 1890s and earlier.  Jaszi and the
program of his party could have signified a new dimension in the
settlement of the nationality question and a new alternative for the
Slovaks: he thought that they should be granted the right to use their
national language and be educated in it.  But he did not recognize the
Slovaks' demand for autonomy and did not take the Czecho-Slovak movement
seriously.

  Discussing the solution of the Slovak problem in the autumn of 1918,
Szarka concentrates mainly on the Prague-Budapest-Turocszentmarton
(Slovak: Turcansky Svaty Martin) "triangle," putting aside the efforts of
the American Slovaks.  It seems that the Slovaks' disorganization, their
general attitude of waiting until the peace conference for a settlement,
and unreliable information, were the three most significant factors in
this period.  Slovak self-determination could be achieved either with the
assistance of the great powers, or through negotiations with the
neighboring states. The choices within these two opportunities were rather
broad, beginning with Slovak autonomy in Hungary, Slovak autonomy in a
Czechoslovak state, a united Czechoslovakia under Czech hegemony, and an
independent Slovak state.  The second of these was the most attractive,
but hardly attainable given the Czechs' plans, including a military
occupation of Slovakia.  The solution to the Slovak problem was achieved
in three stages, and came as a result of the energetic maneuvers of the
Czechs, the failure of Hungarian autonomy proposals despite the fact that
they were fixed by the Law XXX:1919, and Slovak oscillations between
Prague and Budapest. The idea of Slovak autonomy, championed by Andrej
Hlinka, seems to be the only remnant of Slovaks' Hungarian past.  Slovaks
vigorously rejected it and substituted the Czechoslovak version of their
history at the Paris peace conference.

  One may disagree with some of Szarka's conclusions, and one may be
puzzled by the intricacy of his style.  But his book is a meticulous
scholarly work that raises new research perspectives and encourages
discussion among scholars in the field.

NOTES:

1. Laszlo Szarka, _A szlovakok tortenete_ (Budapest: [Beremenyi
   Konyvkiado, 1994]).
2. As an example of the comparative approach to the national
   movements, Russian scholarship can be mentioned; see
   _Formirovanie natsii v tsentral'noi i iugo-vostochnoi Evrope_
   (collection of essays, in Russian). (Moscow: Nauka, 1981).
3. See _Magyarorszag tortenete_ (Budapest: Akademiai kiado,
   1987); v. 6 (1848-1890), v. 7 (1890-1918), especially the chapters by
   Laszlo Katus, as examples of the Hungarian approach to the problem,
   and his widely cited article in _Die nationale Frage in der
   Oesterreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie. 1900-1918_, ed. Peter Hanak
   (Budapest: Akademia, 1967), pp.149-216); _Dejiny Slovenska_ (ed. Samuel
   Cambel), v. 3-4. (Bratislava: Veda, 1986-1992), and the recent work of
   Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, _A history of Slovakia_ (New York: St.
   Martin's Press/London: McMillan 1995) for general accounts of Slovak
   history; and Milan Podrimavsky's book _Slovenska narodna strana v druhej
   polovici XIX storocia_ (Bratislava: Veda, 1983) on the problem of
   Slovak politics.
4. Szarka, op. cit., p. 135.

Irina Popova, Central European University >

      Copyright (c) 1996 by H-Net, all rights reserved.  This work may
      be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is
      given to the reviewer and to HABSBURG. For other permission,
      please contact > and
      >.
+ - Re: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes_ (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear fellow-listmembers,

A further forward from the HABSBURG list.  Copyright notice at end.

Sincerely,
Hugh Agnew


----------------------------Original message----------------------------

Submitted by: John-Paul Himka >


        SLOVAKS AND HUNGARIANS, RURITANIANS AND MEGALOMANIANS

Slovak-Hungarian relations do not in themselves constitute a central
problem of modern East Central European history, but when a good study of
the subject appears, it can count on the attention of a rather wide
audience. It interests those who study Czech-German relations in Bohemia,
Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia and Romanian-Hungarian relations in
Transylvania, to name but a few.  While the specific conjuncture
"Slovaks-Hungarians" is not a crucial historical episode for the region as
a whole, the problematic of which it is one manifestation most definitely
is. Here we have an instance of the larger problem of the relations
between what has been variously called a "nonhistorical," "plebeian,"
"submerged," "small" nation with one that is "historical," "state,"
"dominant" and "great." It is the Ruritanian-Megalomanian nexus that
Ernest Gellner has written about in _Nations and Nationalism_ (Note 1).
For all the pervasiveness of this type of relationship in East Central
Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century, it has never been the
subject of a thorough comparative analysis.

  Comparative work has been done on one side of the relationship, the
Ruritarian side, notably by Miroslav Hroch (Note 2). But Hroch's extremely
valuable study of the national movements of many "small" European nations
fell nonetheless within the paradigm that Irina Popova calls "the history
of discrete entities developing within themselves" and abstracted from
inter-ethnic processes.

  It is not premature to begin imagining a comparative, interpretive study
of the Ruritanian-Megalomanian nexus in East Central Europe, but it is
certainly too early in the game to begin actually working on one. There
simply are not enough studies of the individual relationships to undertake
a comparison. This is one reason why area scholars should welcome Laszlo
Szarka's book, which squarely focuses on the problem of interaction and
shuns the discrete-entity approach.

  Since at least the 1980s many students of nationality have been working
with the idea of nationality as a socio-cultural construction. The work
done within this conceptual framework has been very fruitful, but it has
focussed attention on artificers (the national intelligentsia) and
artifacts (codified language, history, other national characteristics)
within the nationality under investigation, reinforcing the
discrete-entities approach. As Szarka exemplifies, however, the
construction of nationality often (always?) has an important element of
negotiation with another nationality or even (as in the Ukrainian, Jewish
or, for that matter, Slovak cases) with more than one nationality. The
negotiation produces reciprocal influences, often in the form of defining
constitutive limits to a given nationality.  As Szarka/Popova indicate,
Slovaks and Hungarians were concerned about problems of
self-definition-through-the-perhaps-other. What is a Hungarian?  Only a
Magyar? A linguistically Magyarone person of Slovak ethnic heritage? An
individual with a bilingual, bicultural formation? A similarly bicultural
individual who also seeks political autonomy for northern Hungary? These
were among the items on the agenda of negotiations, and how they were
ultimately settled determined in part what a Hungarian was and what a
Slovak was. Thus any attempt to study the formation of a nationality
without a conscientious examination of the important relationships will be
incomplete and, on some points, tautological (starting conceptually with
the definition that in historical reality was only worked out at the end
of the process). That this process of negotiated self-definition was a
matter of some consequence is perhaps more clearly demonstrated by a case
outside of, but related to, the Ruritanian-Megalomanian typology, namely
the Jewish-Megalomanian relationship.  There were certainly historical
moments when the possibility of Jewish inclusion into the German or Polish
nation seemed likely; but in both cases the negotiations failed, and the
failure was part and parcel of the emergence of a new, more agressive
national self-conceptualization on the part of the respective
Megalomanians.

  The relationship with the Megalomanians played an especially important
part in the early stages of the Ruritanian national formations.  For
decades before the articulation of a relatively complete national high
culture of their own, Ruritanians who were capable of it made use of the
Megalomanian high culture. This was, as it were, a larval stage of
national formation. During it, the nascent Ruritanian intelligentsia
developed the overall blueprint of what it would construct as its own
full-fledged national culture. It is difficult to imagine that some
underlying patterns of the Ruritanian high culture would not have
exhibited a decidedly Megalomanian inspiration. But questions such as this
still await their investigator.

  Finally, the value of understanding the R-M relationship as a
relationship, and not just as two discrete entities, is that it forms a
neglected component of a large question that transcends by far the
regional confines of East Central Europe: for concretized in the form of
the encounter between the Ruritanians and the Megalomanians is the
encounter between traditional society and the project of modernity. The
relationship begs for interpretation in these terms and stands to advance
our thinking about the larger problem.

  Of course, to draw up an intellectual wish list, such as I have done
here, is a relatively easy task. But to perform the arduous intellectual
labor leading to its fulfillment is quite another thing, far beyond the
powers of any individual. Guided by a collective instinct and at times by
the consensual selection of particular problems, historians eventually, as
a profession, do press their way forward to the elucidation of the great
issues.  Solidly researched, imaginatively conceptualized monographs lay
the paving stones for this journey. Szarka's book seems to be doing
precisely that.

NOTES

1. Ernest Gellner, _Nations and Nationalism_ (Ithaca/London: Cornell
        University Press, 1983).
2. Miroslav Hroch, _Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A
        Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic
        Groups Among the Smaller European Nations_ (Cambridge/New York:
        Cambridge University Press, 1985).
+ - Re: Szarka, _Szlovak nemzeti fejlodes_ (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear fellow-listmembers,

Another forward from the HABSBURG list (and yes, this is shameless self-
promotion within the meaning of the act ;-)...

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------
From: Hugh L. Agnew, The George Washington University
>

                     CONFLICTUAL ASSOCIATION
  Comments on Popova's Review, _Slovaks in Hungary during the Dualist Era_

I read with interest Irina Popova's review of Laszlo Szarka's _Szlovak
nemzeti fejlodes_ (_Slovak National Development_), and John-Paul Himka's
comments on it.  Like Himka, I am glad to see a study of the Slovaks and
Hungarians during the dualist era that moves away from the exclusive focus
on one or the other aspect of the relationship, but attempts to place that
relationship itself in the center of focus.  I can think of one other
study that attempts something similar on the Czech-German relationship,
Jan Kren's _Konfliktni spolecenstvi: Cesi a Nemci, 1780-1918_
(_Conflictual Association: Czechs and Germans, 1780-1918_; Note 1).  The
point that Himka develops in his central paragraph seems to be one of the
central issues of this relationship as a relationship, as a give and take
between (or among) parties -- that there is a mutual process of
self-definition going on, on each side of this relationship.  It may by
exemplified only by the sour old jokes about Czechs being "Germanized
Slavs" or how there is no such thing as three Hungarians, "since one is a
Slovak and one a Jew."  But since the Megalomanian identity was also only
in the process of constructing itself (see for example the work of Tamas
Hofer or other historically-minded anthropologists), _each_ side
influenced the other.

  What Himka calls "the encounter between traditional society and the
project of modernity" seems to lie at the root of the emergence of many
modern nationalisms the world over (see Anthony Smith's _The Ethnic
Origins of Nations_ or John Breuilly's _Nationalism and the State_; Note
2), but I was intrigued by the suggestion that Szarka applies a kind of
Wallersteinian analysis (Note 3) using center-periphery relationships to
discuss the relationships between Hungarians and Slovaks in the dualist
era.  I wonder if any other readers, or perhaps Popova herself, would like
to comment on the utility of applying these world-system approaches to
such smaller scale relationships?  Or is it a more common-sense redefining
of the terminology?  A further point that seems worth raising to me, again
focusing on the R-M axis as a _relationship_ is that it would be too
simple to see the relationship in terms of R = tradition / M =
modern(izing) in the case of the Slovaks and Hungarians.  Though to some
extent it was true, the Hungarians themselves were acutely conscious at
least since the days of Szechenyi's _Hitel_ that they were (as the
greatest Magyar put it) "backward in everything."  The Hungarians, too,
were facing the "project of modernity."

  Two other things about Popova's review seemed suggestive to me.  She
wrote that Szarka shows "the remarkable consistency of the arguments of
the Hungarian-Slovak debates."  I would suggest that in this case (is this
true of other examples?  I, too, would welcome Himka's vision of a
comparative interpretive study of the R-M nexus), there is a sort of
transitive law in effect. Not only are the arguments remarkably consistent
and tenacious, but, in an illustration of the _mutual_ influencing that
went on in the process of self-definition, there is a remarkable
similarity between the arguments of the Hungarians vis-a-vis the Slovak
(and other) demands for autonomy then, and the Slovak (and other)
arguments against demands for autonomy from their Magyar minorities now.
In another forum once ) I posted the parallel texts
of the Nationality Law of 1868 and the Slovak Republic's Nationality Law,
as well as protests by representatives of nineteenth century Slovaks in
Hungary and twentieth century Magyars in Slovakia.  The similarities were
striking.

  The passage Popova quotes from Szarka, p. 43: "the concept of the
political nation, elevated to the ideal of the Hungarian national state,
together with the real and imagined results of political and linguistic
assimilation, did not jeopardize the existence of the nationalists during
the decades of dualism, but proved to be a regressive force in the
democratization of the country's political life," points out two questions
that I think have relevance to today, as well as fascination as subjects
of historical study.  In relative terms, it seems the Hungarian project of
assimilation _failed_.  In spite of state policies in the educational and
cultural fields, other forces equally supported by the state and part of
the "project of modernization" seem to have worked at least in part to
stimulate the growth of modern Slovak national identity in Upper Hungary.
So a subject for comparative investigation might be the conditions under
which ethnies do not become modern nations under the forces that Szarka
and others have studied.  The other question concerns the compatibility of
nationalist politics and liberal democracy.  Can the state be both a
"nation-state" and liberal and democratic, if it is not ethnically
homogeneous?  The collapse of the "common Hungarian homeland" and the
fortunes of the minorities (and liberal democracy) in its successors
suggest a pessimistic answer.

NOTES

1. Jan Kren, _Konfliktni Spolecenstvi: Cesi a Nemci 1780-1918_  (Praha:
        Academia, 1990).
2. Anthony D. Smith, _The Ethnic Origins of Nations_ (Oxford/New
        York: B. Blackwell, 1987), and John, Breuilly, _Nationalism and the
        State_, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
3. Cf. Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, _The Modern World-system_, vols.
        1-3 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974-1989).
+ - Megalomanians and Ruritanians (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear fellow-listmembers,

Here's another contribution on the thread begun by Ms. Popova's review of
Szarka's book on Slovak-Hungarian relations under dualism.  I'll forward
others as they appear (if they appear!).

Sincerely,

Hugh Agnew

----------------------------Original message----------------------------

From: Victor Hugo Lane IV >
Subject:      Megalomanians and Ruritanians
To: Multiple recipients of list HABSBURG >

The recent correspondence concerning Professor Popova's review of
Professor Szarka's book has been very stimulating.  It is most gratifying
to see the theoretical framework for the eventual, synthetic study of
Megalomanian/Ruritanian relations envisioned by Professor Himka being
discussed, even if the full range of scholarship necessary for such a
project has not been completed.  In an effort to carry this discussion
further I have several thoughts I would like raise.  In the spirt of the
comparative exercise I will try to keep my comments within the framework of
Megalomania/Ruritania, but will make periodic references to my own
speciality of Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia to elaborate points.

     First, I would like to agree with Professor Agnew's point that
modernization may have been an equal concern for Megalomanian and
Ruritanian elites.  Yet, here we run into a question about what
modernity meant to members of these groups.  In the case of Galicia,
neither the Polish, nor the Ukrainian elites associated modernity with
industrialization as we are likely to do today, even in our discussion of
nationalism.  Rather, they tended to focus on the prowess and nature of
their respective cultures as mediators of what Gellner called "universal
high culture."  Not that Polish and Ukrainian ideas about what was
central to "universal high culture" was the same--a matter that itself is
worthy of research. Can the same be said for Slovak and Hungarian ideas
about culture and modernity?

    Second, as Professor Himka points out this is not just a matter of
treating the emergence of modern nationalities in relationship to each
other, but requires us to inquire into the meaning of a particualr
identity and follow changes in the way that identity is understood.  It
seems to me that a Slovak acculturating to Hungarian culture circa 1860,
may be making a different calculation from a Slovak doing the same in
1910, even if the results appear to be the same.

    As such, the value of national self-identification itself needs to be
questioned again and again.  To do this I would like to suggest that we
focus more on the meaning of assimilation or acculturation to
Megalomanians and Ruritanians at different times, as measured not just
by their identification, but by their activities.  For example, Izydor
Sharanevych, the professor of Austrian history at Lemberg University from
the 1870s until roughly 1900, does not appear to have ever considered
lecturing in Polish, which he was not compelled to do, to be inconsistent
with his strong personal identification as a Ruthenian with Russophile
leanings.  The same could not be said of the Ukrainian professors who
joined the university faculty after the arrival of Hrushevsky in 1894.

     This metaphoric description of the period when Megalomanian and
Ruritanian identity do not appear to have been viewed as mutually
exclusive as a "larval stage" is a striking one.  In particular, it
provides an effective image for explaining the transformation into an
antagonistic relationship in what we infer is the "butterfly stage."
Yet, for all its attractiveness, I fear it too perpetuates the old na-
tional paradigm in which nations are treated almost as existing for and
of themselves.  After all, during this stage it is not just the
Ruritanian attitude towards Megalomanian identity that is different, but
also Megalomanian ideas about Ruritanian identity.  During this stage,
Meglamanians paradoxically treat Ruritanian identity as both distinct and
yet dependent on Megalomanian culture.  I suspect that a more
comprehensive consideration of this stage in the relatinship will also
help provide an even more satisfactory appreciation for the reasons for
the eventual antagonism that develops between the two groups.

     Finally, as to the query about the applicability of
core-periphery analysis, I have these thoughts.  As Hugh Agnew pointed
out Hungarians were themselves aware that they were not at the center,
otherwise, they would not have been concerned about their own
backwardness as the Szechenyi quote suggests.  Thus, even if there is
some validity to the core-periphery analysis between central and
northwestern Hungary, it does not stop there, since beyond lay Vienna
andd Germany, France, and England all of whichwere even more central core
than central Hungary.  Reference to these gradations between core and
periphery would I believe provide further insights, but I wonder if
avoiding that complicating factor may weaken the effectiveness of the
core-periphery analysis.

     Consider the problems posed by Galicia, which offer some interesting
permutations that need to be considered.  We are no used to assuming that
the nationalities problems in Galicia must be focused on Polish and
Ukrainian relations, that we tend to forget that in the core periphery
model, a single Galician identity sholud nave been as likely a
development in reaction to the Austrian core.  What are we to make of
Lemberg?  A Polish capital--at least after 1867, but one that was in many
respects peripheral to Cracow, while being smack in the middle of what
might be called the Ukrainian center in Galicia.  How does that compare
with the situation in Hungary and more specifically Bratislava/Pozsony?

     In closing, given the interest sparked by this book I would like to
voice my hope that the response may precipitate work on a translation for
those of us, who have engaged our linguistic talents learning other
languages.
                          Sincerely yours,
                          Hugo Lane, University of Michigan
+ - Mr. Kornai's hate speech reasoning. (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Mr. Kornai jumps in without any hesitation, and writes:

>I am pleased to see that too. There are few people who merit the summary
>description `Nazi scumbag' as clearly as Mr. Neme1nyi, whose primary line
>of argumentation always boils down to the following points:
>
>1. _Perhaps_ Sza1lasi was bad, but the communists were much worse.
>2. The communists are all Jews.
>3. Today's liberals are a continuation of communist power, and they
>are also Jews.
>4. The Jews don't _always_ sacrifice young children in ritual murders
>and drink their blood, he never said they _always_ do this.

If that is all Mr. Kornai can come up, than he wasted his time.
Let me answer to those points:

1: Because human suffering seems to be judged by numbers, there is not even
   a doubt, that under communist rule, much more people perished than under
   other extremist powers. That is a fact! But it does not make any totali-
   tarian groups less or more guilty in my eyes though.
   I am not for the number game You know.  Even the loss  of  one  innocent
   human being is a loss of the human race.   And guess what?   It does not
   matter what the victim's religion or race.
2: Be careful with the "ALL" word! You might have to prove that I ever wrote
   such. If You can't, than You are nothing but a liar!
   According to such writers as the famous Jewish writer, Arthur Koestner, a
   large number of Jews were communists. Does it mean, Koestner stated, that
   "ALL" the Jews were communists? If it does, than Koestner was an antisemi-
   tic nazi scumbag pig. Was He, Mr. Kornai ?
3: There was a quite famous Hungarian blood accusation in which a Hungarian
   noble woman, Erzsebeth Bathory {if I remember right} was sentenced  and
   locked away.
   Can We draw a line to Mr. Kornai's third point and say:  "The Hungarians
   don't _always_ sacrifice young girls and bathe in their blood" {as the
   Hungarian case was}.
   Mr. Kornai is missing the point. :-) So I state again. The sin of the few
   in my eyes should not make the masses to suffer. But We all know that
   history proved that the sin of the few makes the suffer of the whole in
   many instances.

But Mr. Kornai goes further:

>Neme1nyi never misses an opportunity to note that this or that communist was
>of Jewish origin -- Trotsky's name is follwed by (Bronstein) in parentheses,
>that sort of thing. When one of his opponents mentions that gee, he somehow
>always fails to note the opposite, the reply comes straight from his heart:

Usually people do not hide behind adopted names, unless they have a selfser-
ving reason to do so. Mentioning the real name of historical figure is quite
a common practise in the "Free World's" history books.
It seems that to Mr. Kornai, "Freedom of Speech" means something different
than to me.

>Here we see the first occurrence of ritual murders, this time in India.

Oh boy, so I am antiindian as well? :-)

>Oh, yes, the masses. Now the few, or not so few, who were really guilty of
>ritual murder ("blood accusation" is of course "ve1rva1d", a term familiar
>to students of Hungarian history), they just deserved what they got.

No. Mr Kornai is wrong. They got off the hook.

>And as far as the epithet `Nazi scumbag' goes, rarely do we see such a
>splendid specimen outside FORUM. If Mr. Farkas is willing to undertake
>a more extensive translation effort, the FORUM archives have virtually
>unlimited supplies of what Ga1bor Fencsik calls `Goebbelsian gibberish'.
>'nuff said.

Wow, does it not sound like a "HATE SPEECH"? How about some tolerance
Mr. Kornai?

NPA.
+ - Re: History (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article <v01510100adc3e2634ad6@[204.134.209.51]>, CHARLES J CSIPKAY
> writes:

> But I did mean, that the eternal clashes on
>gayness don't really belong here, and are utterly boring. Like religion,
>gayness is not debatable. The gays despise the straights, the straights
>despise the gays, and never the twain will meet. It's not a Hungarian
>problem, it's global. As far as I know, the net has some gay and lesbian
>lists, argue there, if you must.

The discussion on gayness started when a reader inquired if Hungary
catered to gay turists. Offcourse, like with most subjects on the ng, it
became an issue. I do not agree with your blanket statement, that the gays
despise the straights and the straights despise the gays. It is not my
lifestyle, but I interact with gays every day; either at work or socially.
We practice mutual respect.

mep
+ - Hungary (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Hi,

I am interested in any information on Hungary.  In particular, my sisters
are traveling soon to Hungary to see the country and try to obtain
genealogical information.  (Our grandparents came over back in 1910's and
settled in Canton, Ohio).
I would like to contact living (long-lost) relatives based on our
lineage names (Stanesics and Both) and the town of Nagyatad.  Are there local
phone books on Internet?
Any other information regarding genealogical research in Hungary
(libraries/court houses, etc...)
would be appreciated.

You are encouraged to send info to me directly at .

Thanks,
Bill
+ - Re: Marx meat (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In article >, Joe Szalai
> writes:

>Now I ask you, Sam.  Do you really think it's fair to call Marx a hack?
>Does he have nothing to say?
I think the question might more accurately be whether Marx has anything
legitimate to say given his willingness to indulge in non-empirical
manipulation of the evidence to accord with his predetermined outcomes.
The Marxist-Leninists treasure Marx for what they see as his clarity of
insight and predictive abilities. Yet, if Marx's version of history is
inevitable, why the shabby misquotations and fraudulent misuse of data in
his work? As far as the inevitability of Marx's version of history, well
we have seen how thoroughly history has hosed that down in the past few
decades.

Let me ask you a question, Joe: how long do you cling to this outdated
claptrap before you finally admit that, for all your appreciation of his
poetic (to me, somnambulent) sturm and drang, Marx just got it terribly
wrong? You, unlike Eva Durant, have actually proven to me in the past that
you can think for yourself.
Sam Stowe
+ - Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

In the land of term inflation, where the two cent grommet is a "tremendous
value" and the 1965 car a "classic" I think I'm fighting a losing battle on
this szabadsa1gharc matter. Yet term inflation, just as grade inflation in
school, is ultimately a bad thing, so I'll try one more time. It seems a great
many historical conflicts are also fought on the verbal plane, and certainly
1956 was no different. While it was in progress, it was evident to all
participants that what happened was a _revolution_ (forradalom). Any
synononymous term will do just as well: it was a _revolt_ (felkele1s), a
_popular uprising_ (ne1pfelkele1s). When it was crushed, this is what it was
in the minds of the people: a crushed revolution (levert forradalom), not a
lost war (vesztett ha1boru1).

The victors impudently tried to rename the revolution a counter-revolution
(ellenforradalom), and called themselves the "Revolutionary Workers' and
Peasants' Government" (forradalmi munka1s-paraszt korma1ny). But they didn't
ever succeed in this, and eventually dropped the attempt together with the
other tools of their victory, the executions and the inprisonments. I grew
up at about this time, the early sixties, when you simply couldn't find a
decent man to utter the term "ellenforradalom". The history books still
contained the term, but fortunately chronological order meant that this was
the last lesson in any history curriculum, and somehow teachers always fell
behind their schedules just enough that there was never time for this at the
end of the term. An uneasy verbal compromise emerged, and nobody talked about
"revolution" or "counterrevolution" any more. If the subject came up, these
were the "events of 56" (56-os eseme1nyek) or, as time went by, simply "56".

What kind of revolution it was is still a matter of debate -- it was very
anti-stalinist, but it wasn't anti-communist. Just before it was crushed,
there was peace in the land, with the Nagy government (led by an old-time
communist, make no mistake) enjoying tremendous popular support. Both the
composition of the government and the spontaneously emerging power structure
embodied in the Workers' Councils (munka1stana1csok) suggests that it was a
fundamentally left-wing, socialist revolution. Certainly it wasn't the kind of
`conservative revolution' that we have seen with Thatcher and Reagan.
Mindszenty did not win the hearts and minds of the people, Imre Nagy did.
Also, it was a great moment of national pride, both in the accomplishment
(finally, Hungarians excercised their right of self-determination, and
sovereignly did what they wanted), and in the fact that the imperial yoke of
the Soviet Union was thrown off. But this `anti-imperialist' sentiment was by
no means the anti-Soviet or anti-Russian hatred many would like to cast it.

Then came the fateful days of the invasion. This is where my version of
history and Csaba Zolta1ni's version are at odds: he thinks that the token
resistance offered by Hungary was a revolutionary war/war of independence, and
I think this is preposterous nonsense promoted by the vast majority of 56
emigres who were brave enough to emigrate but not brave enough to stand up and
fight. I'm not condemning them for not fighting (and of course there were a
handful who did), certainly many of them did many brave things before they
left, but there is a fundamental difference between general strikes and
passive resistance on the one hand, and armed conflict on the other. Like
Admiral Borda, these people are collectively awarding themselves combat
stripes they don't deserve.

>From all accounts I've seen so far, there was nothing in the actions of Borda
that couldn't have been painted over. But when all is said and done this was a
fundamentally honest man who _knew_ he didn't deserve the combat stripes.
It's time Csaba Zolta1ni and other promoters of the "szabadsa1gharc" myth fess
up. I don't expect them to restore their honor by committing suicide, but I do
expect them to cut the crap. Hungarian society preserved a very good memory of
who fought to the bitter end and who didn't. I'm offended by seeing Andra1s
Pellionisz posing as a heroic freedom fighter. The guy was 13 years old at the
time, and probably clutched mommy's apron all along. Certainly he didn't join
Pongra1cz at Corvin ko2z (several 13-year olds and even younger kids did so).
How dare he exhort the public to "complete 56" (fejezzu2k be 56-ot -- note the
insidious use of the second person plural), and how dare these other mythmakers
continue with this apalling nonsense? Cut it out, fellas, you are trampling on
the honor of the few who actually fought.

Andra1s Kornai
+ - Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Dear A. Kornai,

you wrote:

>sovereignly did what they wanted), and in the fact that the imperial yoke of
>the Soviet Union was thrown off. But this `anti-imperialist' sentiment was by
>no means the anti-Soviet or anti-Russian hatred many would like to cast it.

Do you really think, that a simple worker (let's say with 8 elementary but no
high school education) or those teenager or even the most educated university
student did (or could) make such a nice 'theoretical' distinction during '56'?
I doubt.

And here is what I was offended by a little bit (or not so little):

>Then came the fateful days of the invasion. This is where my version of
>history and Csaba Zolta1ni's version are at odds: he thinks that the token
>resistance offered by Hungary was a revolutionary war/war of independence, and
>I think this is preposterous nonsense promoted by the vast majority of 56
>emigres who were brave enough to emigrate but not brave enough to stand up and
>fight.

May I ask who you are to tell what is a 'token' resistence and what is not and
who is brave and who is not?
How many battle or fight have you ever seen? Have you ever had anything to do
with an army or a simple machine gun? Do not misunderstand me I am not a hero
or 'freedomfighter'. I haven't even borned at 1956. I have served my regular
time in the Hungarian Army (1 year as 'elofelvetelis') and that is all. I would
be afraid of however to judge any battle fought by others, I am sorry if I had
ever done it. One can compare battles to each other, like you may say '56' was
a 'token' battle compared to Afganistan or the Yugoslav guerilla war against
the German. But here you should take account a lots of things like the
geographical features (mountains, deserts vs. populated urban areas), cultural
differences (mujjahedins vs students,workers,teenagers).
BTW would you mind telling me what is not 'token' resistance according your
standards. How many thousand deads, wounded, tortured, raped, etc?
Can a lost fight be a real resistance or only the victorious can qualify?
What should be the bitterness of the fight? The scale: 1, The people in
Prague who tried to argue the Russian invaders in 1968. .........10, The
Mujjaheddins who ripped the skin of their prisoners alive.

J.Zsargo
+ - Re: 1956 was a Szabadsagharc (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 12:36 PM 5/20/96 EDT,Csaba Zoltani wrote:

>Several respondents of this discussion group have questioned the
>appropriateness of calling that 'bright and shining moment' in recent
>Hungarian history, the events of October and November 1956, a fight for
>freedom, a szabadsagharc. They got it wrong.

        I really don't think that I got it wrong or Jeliko got it wrong.
"Fight for freedom" doesn't mean the same thing as "szabadsagharc" in
Hungarian. In Hungarian the word "szabadsagharc" is hardly ever used,
especially in every day speech, describing the events of 1956. We always
talked about "revolution/forradalom," "56." We still do.

>The immediate events which led up to October 1956 was a revolt within
>Hungarian society against the party in power. The revulsion against the
>party, whose legitimacy to rule has been questioned from the start since
>it gained, and subsequently remained in power only because of the
>presence of and on the insistence of an occupying military power, soon
>enveloped the whole society. What began as a desire for reform,
>developed into a revolution, a desire to throw off a usurping power
>structure. With the Russian intervention, the revolution became a fight
>for freedom, the classical szabadsagharc.

        There is a bit of chronological problem with this neat description
of events: first reform movement turned into revolution, which subsequently
turned into war of independence. The actual fighting began around 10 p.m. on
the 23rd and a few hours later--about 5 o'clock in the morning the Russians
were already shooting the hell out of us on Rakoczi Street and Kiskorut
corner. The Hungarian government invited them to intervene but I think they
would have intervened regardless.


>Parallels to 1848-49 are evident. Then too, desire for internal reforms
>soon came up against a de facto colonial power which wanted to maintain the
>status quo. When the attempt to throw out the foreign oppressor was met
>with military force, the 'lawful revolution' became a szabadsagharc.

        Because of my problem with chronology I can't see the parallel with
1848 at all. First of all, as opposed to 1848 the "revolutionary" phase was
not peaceful. There was fighting between certain segments of the population
and the AVH, guarding the Radio Station. There was nothing like that in 48.
No Hungarian fought Hungarian on March 15th or all through the summer of
1848 and even later it was Hungary's nationalities and the Habsburg armies
on one side and Hungarians on the other side. Besides, I really have
problems with descriptions like "foreign oppressor." The Habsburgs, whether
you like it or not, were the lawful, legitimate kings of Hungary. Sure,
there was always a huge argument about Hungary's relationship to the other
Austrian provinces: Was the relationship simply based on a personal union or
was the union a closer one. Hungary wanted to have only a personal union but
the sixteenth-century arrangement which brought Ferdinand to the Hungarian
throne wasn't terribly explicit about it. And, of course, the Habsburgs
themselves never agreed to an arrangement based only on personal union. That
was at the center of the argument in 1848-49.

        The situation in 1956 vis-a-vis Russia was a very different one. The
Soviet Union, unlike the Habsburgs, had absolutely no legitimate claim to
Hungary, except through military operations as victors in the war. Hungary,
independent on paper, had no sovereign power whatsoever. One of the very
early demands, already voiced during the demonstration in the afternoon was
that the Soviet troops leave Hungarian soil. However, at that point no one
was talking about leaving the Warsaw Pact.

>Sandor Taraszovics, an active participant in the szabadsagharc of 1956,
>recalls that Bela Kiraly, commander of the National Guard, already in
>1956 called the events "nemzeti demokratikus forradalom es
>szabadsagharc" (a national democratic revolution and fight for freedom).

        I very much doubt that Bela Kiraly would attach a tremendous
significance to that kind of distinction. I.e., that for some strange reason
"szabadsagharc" is superior to "forradalom." But we can certainly ask him!

>Kadar and his minions left no stone unturned to deny the legitimacy of
>Hungary's fight for freedom or to suppress any expression of national
>consciousness. At first they labeled '56 a CIA inspired
>counter-revolution, a fascist plot, a criminal undertaking. Yet, time
>marches on. In the waning days of the Kadar dictatorship, reality could
>no longer be denied: '56 became a 'nemzeti felkeles' (national
>uprising). Today, few can marshall cogent arguments against calling it
>what it really was : a szabadsagharc.

        I think that the distinction is artificial in addition to be
linguistically confusing.

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: ...dominated 1700s... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 09:30 PM 5/21/96 +0200,Gyorgy Kadar wrote:
>        Lectoris Salutem!
>        As it is known communication procedures are very redundant. When
>somebody wants to tell (repeat: tell, not only conversate of) something,
>it is difficult to separate the main essence from the explanation of
>non-essential circumstances, deemed necessary to explain.
>        In the last couple of days my postings did not want to tell
>anything more, than this: Solidarity and cooperation among the population
>of Hungary was obstacled and/or undermined by careless "management" of the
>country by the Habsburg kings in the 1526-1820 period. Behavior patterns
>engraved during those - essential for Europe - 300 years might govern our
>behavior even these days.


        And I wrote a fairly long historical rebuttal. My feeling is that
the so-called Habsburg oppression has nothing to do whatsoever with the
behavior of the population today.


>        In my personal vocabulary "passive resistance" does not contradict
>to individual success, development of personal values, even wealth. The
>point is the refusal of goals outlined by the king/government, but the
>passive resistant may follow his own best goals.

        Having a personal vocabulary is somewhat dangerous. It is better to
use vocabulary we all understand to mean the same thing.

>
>        BE> "So, what you are actually saying is the following:"...
>        No! What I was actually saying, it was written there by myself...
>The responder to my posting seems to want a dialog with herself, playing
>the role of her partner too...

        Here I simply want to know why you are so antagonistic. Do you have
find my interpretation of Hungarian history not to your liking? And what
about if I am correct and it wasn't so much the bad, bad king but the bad,
bad Hungarian nobility who was responsible for the state of affairs? Or,
let's be even less controversial: both sides were to blame. I assume that is
not acceptable as far as you are concerned. And finally, I outlined a
different historical development but you ignored all of it completely. Why
don't you try to answer me?


>        When I wrote: "...any janitor of ...Budapest Bank is better paid
>than a university docent...", then I meant, what I wrote. I was not
>complaining of the income of the university docent. I was comparing two
>things. I would ask here: Could a janitor replace a university docent
>at the same level of quality as  a university docent can replace a
>janitor (if necessary)?

        But that's not the point. The point is in the Hungarian context that
the janitor is most likely in the private sector and the associate professor
is employed by the government. And the Hungarian government, the public
sector, is in big financial trouble. And it is hard to figure out what that
has to do with the course of Hungarian history.

>        Hungarian nobility was not "nasty" to the "not *Hungarian* King".
>"Nastiness" assumes organized behaviour. No! The problem was exactly the
>disorganized, passively resistant behaviour. But they only reacted to the
>carelessness, or better to say, they did not have any positive thing to
>react to...

        Well, let's not get hang up on words like "nastiness." I was just
being colloquial. And what do you mean by not being organized. There was a
Diet--it was organized all right. There were the county assemblies--those
were organized too.


>        Czech were taken care of by the Habsburgs. E.g. Prague was
>temporarily even the capital headquarter of some Habsburg Emperors (if
>Madach knew history correctly).

        Now, I don't want to be nasty like you but if you are relying on
Madach for history, we are all in trouble. Yes, Prague was the capital for a
short while. And if you ask the Czechs they would hardly agree with your
statement that the "Czechs were taken care of the Habsburgs" in a positive
sense. The Czechs actually thought that the Hungarians did OK and they were
the ones who were not treated fairly.

>The Polish society was similarly abandoned
>as Hungary, the difference was that for shorter period (from 1795?) and
>without any illusion, that is they did not even expected any care from the
>Czar or the Germans or the Habsburgs. All the three were Turks for them...

        Polish society was abandoned. By whom? If a society cannot take care
of itself, no one is going to come to its rescue! And why should they. The
Polish nobility was an awfully selfish lot: they refused to pay for the
defense of the country and as a result Poland fell to its enemies. The
elections of kings didn't help the situation either. I don't know whether
you know any Polish history but the Polish nobility was practically asking
for foreign interference!

>
>        BE> "What about us? Are we entirely blameless?"
>        Yes! YOU... are entirely blameless.

        Again, awful nastiness on your part!! I would be ashamed in your
place! Let's phrase it in some other way: Were our ancestors entirely
blameless? Were the Hungarian nobility entirely bameless?

>As for us, here? Let me try to borrow the words of Radnoti and let me try
>to translate what he wrote, and I apologize him for trying to solve an
>impossible task ...
>        ...We are guilty, as all the other nations.
>        We know, what we are to blame for, when, how much and why...
>        But there live workers here, and blameless poets
>        And newborn babies, who will grow to be sensible
>        Their wisdom will shine inside them,
>        preserved even hiding in the darkness of caves,
>        since the sign of peace will be engraved again on our homeland...
>        They will respond with fresh words to our strangled words...
>        May the great wing of the vigilant night cloud enfold us...
>
        I like Radnoti, but let's not drag poetry into this question. This
is a favorite Hungarian ploy. If we cannot discuss something in a rational
manner, we resort to some poet's golden words! In my opinion the Hungarians
(nobility in those days because they were the only political nation in the
land) were not blameless. Just as the Polish nobility was not blameless.
        Instead of being ugly, why don't do read a few history books and try
to figure out what the role of the Hungarian nobility was in this sorry affair.

        Eva Balogh
+ - Re: szabadsa1gharc (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

At 01:17 PM 5/21/96 -0700, Andras Kornai wrote:

>In the land of term inflation, where the two cent grommet is a "tremendous
>value" and the 1965 car a "classic" I think I'm fighting a losing battle on
>this szabadsa1gharc matter.

        In the short run perhaps, you are fighting a losing battle but not
in the long run. Because, believe me ,in fifty years or so, when the dust
settles on this business about "szabadsagharc" your point of view will
triumph. At least in the history books.

>While it was in progress, it was evident to all
>participants that what happened was a _revolution_ (forradalom). Any
>synononymous term will do just as well: it was a _revolt_ (felkele1s), a
>_popular uprising_ (ne1pfelkele1s). When it was crushed, this is what it was
>in the minds of the people: a crushed revolution (levert forradalom), not a
>lost war (vesztett ha1boru1).

        Absolutely correct. I was an eyewitness and a participant.
>
>The victors impudently tried to rename the revolution a counter-revolutio
>(ellenforradalom), and called themselves the "Revolutionary Workers' and
>Peasants' Government" (forradalmi munka1s-paraszt korma1ny). But they didn't
>ever succeed in this, and eventually dropped the attempt together with the
>other tools of their victory, the executions and the inprisonments. I grew
>up at about this time, the early sixties, when you simply couldn't find a
>decent man to utter the term "ellenforradalom". The history books still
>contained the term, but fortunately chronological order meant that this was
>the last lesson in any history curriculum, and somehow teachers always fell
>behind their schedules just enough that there was never time for this at the
>end of the term. An uneasy verbal compromise emerged, and nobody talked about
>"revolution" or "counterrevolution" any more. If the subject came up, these
>were the "events of 56" (56-os eseme1nyek) or, as time went by, simply "56".

        Again, very true. And, of course, one had to be careful even talking
about it. The revolution, 56, was a taboo. If the conversation turned in the
direction of 56 or the revolution, the host or the hostess immediately got
up and closed all the windows and we all lowered our voices.

>What kind of revolution it was is still a matter of debate -- it was very
>anti-stalinist, but it wasn't anti-communist. Just before it was crushed,
>there was peace in the land, with the Nagy government (led by an old-time
>communist, make no mistake) enjoying tremendous popular support. Both the
>composition of the government and the spontaneously emerging power structure
>embodied in the Workers' Councils (munka1stana1csok) suggests that it was a
>fundamentally left-wing, socialist revolution.

        Correct! But, of course, if allowed to come to fruition it would
have blossomed into a multi-party system with perhaps the right of center
parties in majority. That is, of course, only a guess on my part, but I had
a strong suspicion at the time.

>Certainly it wasn't the kind of
>`conservative revolution' that we have seen with Thatcher and Reagan.
>Mindszenty did not win the hearts and minds of the people, Imre Nagy did.
>Also, it was a great moment of national pride, both in the accomplishment
>(finally, Hungarians excercised their right of self-determination, and
>sovereignly did what they wanted), and in the fact that the imperial yoke of
>the Soviet Union was thrown off. But this `anti-imperialist' sentiment was by
>no means the anti-Soviet or anti-Russian hatred many would like to cast it.

        I agree. We felt sorry for these young Russian kids who didn't even
know exactly where they were and against whom they fought.


>Then came the fateful days of the invasion. This is where my version of
>history and Csaba Zolta1ni's version are at odds: he thinks that the token
>resistance offered by Hungary was a revolutionary war/war of independence, and
>I think this is preposterous nonsense promoted by the vast majority of 56
>emigres who were brave enough to emigrate but not brave enough to stand up and
>fight. I'm not condemning them for not fighting (and of course there were a
>handful who did), certainly many of them did many brave things before they
>left, but there is a fundamental difference between general strikes and
>passive resistance on the one hand, and armed conflict on the other. Like
>Admiral Borda, these people are collectively awarding themselves combat
>stripes they don't deserve.

        Although I agree that it wasn't much of a war of independence but I
would be less harsh on us. I got as far as filling bottles from a gus pump
on the Kiskorut, and putting down white soup plates (taken from the Astoria
Hotel) covered with dirt across the the road in front of the hotel (I heard
later that some French magazine had our pictures splattered on its cover--I
never saw it.) in order to make the Russians think that these were mines--it
even worked for a couple of days! But fighting the Russian army was pretty
hopeless. It would have meant suicide and most of us decided not to continue
such uneven struggle. The army recruits were sent home and the army itself
basically remained neutral.


>I'm offended by seeing Andra1s
>Pellionisz posing as a heroic freedom fighter. The guy was 13 years old at the
>time, and probably clutched mommy's apron all along. Certainly he didn't join
>Pongra1cz at Corvin ko2z (several 13-year olds and even younger kids did so).
>How dare he exhort the public to "complete 56" (fejezzu2k be 56-ot -- note the
>insidious use of the second person plural), and how dare these other mythmaker
s
>continue with this apalling nonsense? Cut it out, fellas, you are trampling on
>the honor of the few who actually fought.

        Andras, if you are offended by Pellionisz posing as a heroic freedom
fighter, imagine me who actually was an active participant. I was the head
of the student association at my dormitory; I was a member of the Budapest
Revolutionary Student Council; I would have been a part of the Imre Nagy
trial if I hadn't decided to emigrate in the middle of December. Can you
imagine how I feel? Sick!

        Eva Balogh
+ - [61] PARLIAMENT RECOGNIZES SAME-SEX COMMON-LAW RELATION (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

+ BUDAPEST, Hungary (AP) -- Common-law relationships between homosexuals will
+ be recognized under a law adopted Tuesday by Hungary's Parliament.  The new
+ law will entitle gays to inherit property from their partners and receive a
+ deceased partner's pension, but will not allow them to adopt children.

+ Parliament members approved the civil code amendment 207 to 73, with five
+ abstentions.  The amendment was required after a Constitutional Court ruled
+ in March 1995 that recognition of common-law relationships must be extended
+ to homosexual couples.

I can only applaud this law both for what it accomplishes, which is raising a
minority from a legally disadvantaged status to the level of ordinary
citizens, and for what it leaves out, which is adoption. In my personal view
the general level of prejudice in Hungary is such that the idea of same-sex
couples adopting children would have raised considerable outcry, possibly to
the point that the issue would have simmered to become a campaign issue two
years hence, with revocation of the law in the cards. A good compromise on
this matter is much better than nothing, which is what the US has.  On another
note, it looks from the count like Fidesz voted against it. If so, they
succeeded in losing the last shreds of their liberal heritage, but no doubt
gaining the symapthy of Dr. Aids in the process:-(

Andra1s Kornai
+ - Re: ...dominated 1700s... (mind) VÁLASZ  Feladó: (cikkei)

Lectoris Salutem!
        As it is known communication procedures are very redundant. When
somebody wants to tell (repeat: tell, not only conversate of) something,
it is difficult to separate the main essence from the explanation of
non-essential circumstances, deemed necessary to explain.
        In the last couple of days my postings did not want to tell
anything more, than this: Solidarity and cooperation among the population
of Hungary was obstacled and/or undermined by careless "management" of the
country by the Habsburg kings in the 1526-1820 period. Behavior patterns
engraved during those - essential for Europe - 300 years might govern our
behavior even these days.
        That was all, all the other words were only explanatory additions.
        And so are my following words too...

        In my personal vocabulary "passive resistance" does not contradict
to individual success, development of personal values, even wealth. The
point is the refusal of goals outlined by the king/government, but the
passive resistant may follow his own best goals.

        BE> "So, what you are actually saying is the following:"...
        No! What I was actually saying, it was written there by myself...
The responder to my posting seems to want a dialog with herself, playing
the role of her partner too...

        BE> "...after 1867... there was spectacular economic growth..."
        Thanks for repeating one of my points, I enlisted previously the
40 years of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Bethlen decade, the
1945-48 years (shorter and shorter...), as examples of cooperation...
But I thought it was intended to contradict my statement(s)...

        When I wrote: "...any janitor of ...Budapest Bank is better paid
than a university docent...", then I meant, what I wrote. I was not
complaining of the income of the university docent. I was comparing two
things. I would ask here: Could a janitor replace a university docent
at the same level of quality as  a university docent can replace a
janitor (if necessary)?

        Hungarian nobility was not "nasty" to the "not *Hungarian* King".
"Nastiness" assumes organized behaviour. No! The problem was exactly the
disorganized, passively resistant behaviour. But they only reacted to the
carelessness, or better to say, they did not have any positive thing to
react to...

        Czech were taken care of by the Habsburgs. E.g. Prague was
temporarily even the capital headquarter of some Habsburg Emperors (if
Madach knew history correctly). The Polish society was similarly abandoned
as Hungary, the difference was that for shorter period (from 1795?) and
without any illusion, that is they did not even expected any care from the
Czar or the Germans or the Habsburgs. All the three were Turks for them...

        BE> "What about us? Are we entirely blameless?"
        Yes! YOU... are entirely blameless.
As for us, here? Let me try to borrow the words of Radnoti and let me try
to translate what he wrote, and I apologize him for trying to solve an
impossible task ...
        ...We are guilty, as all the other nations.
        We know, what we are to blame for, when, how much and why...
        But there live workers here, and blameless poets
        And newborn babies, who will grow to be sensible
        Their wisdom will shine inside them,
        preserved even hiding in the darkness of caves,
        since the sign of peace will be engraved again on our homeland...
        They will respond with fresh words to our strangled words...
        May the great wing of the vigilant night cloud enfold us...

        And may God bless us all...             kadargyorgy

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